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resting on thought-experiments about mal-
functioning Star Trek-style teleporters, actual
experiments involving brain bisection, and
mash-ups that speculate about the transplant of
cerebral hemispheres. The basic idea is that, in
the absence of an immaterial soul, what unifies
me over time – what makes me, now, the same
person who started writing this review last
week – is a web of relations between events in
the intervening days. The most important of
these relations are psychological, matters of
continuity and connection in memory, belief
and will, which I can bear to other people, too,
though I typically do so to vastly lesser
degrees. If this is all there is to being me, Parfit
argues, the “separateness of persons” is dimin-
ished, and the rational response is a corre-
sponding diminution in self-interest, a greater
willingness to sacrifice myself for the greater
good. There is a path from the insubstantial
nature of personal identity to a more altruistic
ethics.
There are notable gaps in Parfit’s reasoning.
His argument neglects the view that we are
fundamentally human: our identity and per-
sistence are a function of biology, not mental
life. That is a glaring omission. Writing about
personal identity without addressing the idea
that we are animals of a certain species is like
attempting to escape from a locked room with-
out ever trying the key. But what is now called
“animalism” was not well-articulated when
Parfit was writing and its subsequent develop-
ment owes much to him. Nor does he ignore it
in later work. Parfit objects to animalism in a
recent essay, alarmingly titled “We Are Not
Human Beings”. In Reasons and Persons, his
clipped prose, with its repetitive sentences,
poetic cadence and sly humour becomes the
vehicle for a depth and range of insight rarely
matched in recent philosophy. The upshot is an
Anglicized version of the Buddhist “no-self”
view, a philosophy that could change your life.
Fast forward almost thirty years, and as pas-
sages from Reasons and Persons were being
chanted by Tibetan monks, Parfit published
the first two volumes of his long-awaited
sequel, On What Matters. It too is metaphysi-
cal, but what interests Parfit now is not the
metaphysics of persons but of reasons for act-
ing. According to Parfit, there are objective
truths about how we should live, what there is
reason to do, and what is right and wrong, that
are irreducible, causally inert, and wholly
independent of us. Not only are these truths
independent of what we think and of our nature
as human beings, the reasons that govern us are
independent of what we want. None of this
prevents us from knowing what they are.
Through this austere lens, Parfit frames a
theory of right action as obedience to princi-
ples it would make sense for everyone to legis-
late for all.
Volume One of On What Matters is devoted
to the interpretation of this gnomic principle,
which adapts and renovates a formula from
Kant: “Act only on that maxim through which
you can at the same time will that it become a
universal law”. But this is not the subject of the
books under review. They focus instead on
Parfit’s “non-reductive cognitivism”, his
belief in ethical truths that are utterly unlike
truths about anything else in the world. Peter
Singer’s authoritative collection, Does Any-
thing Really Matter?, includes a range of
responses to Parfit, in turns admiring, critical
and conciliatory. Volume Three of On What
Matters gives Parfit’s replies, along with some
striking new material on the morality of caus-
ing and preventing harm.
The first thing to say about Parfit’s “meta-
ethics” – his theory of the meaning, metaphys-
ics and epistemology of ethical claims – is that,
unlike his dramatic conclusions about the eth-
ics of identity, it is not exactly new. The idea
that ethical truths are objective and irreducible
was commonplace among the British moral
philosophers of the early twentieth century: G.
E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and Parfit’s favourite,
Henry Sidgwick. In his Principia Ethica, a
bible of the Bloomsbury Group, Moore argued
that the ethical sense of “good” is utterly unan-
alysable. It stands for a property whose nature
cannot be explained in other terms. That is
what Parfit believes about his central concept,
the concept of a “normative reason”, a consid-
eration that counts in favour of something, as
when there is reason to act in a certain way, to
want a given outcome, or to hold a particular
belief.
Parfit’s argument for irreducibility begins
by dismissing “Analytical Naturalism”, which
aims to specify what “reason” means in natu-
ralistic, non-normative terms. Like many phi-
losophers, Parfit is sceptical of this approach.
If we can say in other terms what it is to be a
reason, it is by doing metaphysics, not linguis-
tic analysis. That is how we learn that heat is
molecular kinetic energy, for example – not by
analysing words but by investigating its
nature. For Parfit, what blocks this approach to
reasons is the principle that, when it is inform-
ative to learn that what is A is also B, (even
though being A is the same as being B), the
meaning of either “A” or “B” can be further
analysed. For instance, in the case of heat, it is
informative to learn that what is hot has high
molecular kinetic energy because, even
though these terms pick out a single property,
they do so in different ways. The meaning of
“hot” can be analysed, Parfit thinks, in terms of
the causes and effects of heat. This sets the
stage for his central argument. Since the mean-
ing of “reason” cannot be further analysed and
it is informative to learn, in other terms, when
something is a reason, it follows by Parfit’s
principle that the property of being a reason
cannot be identified with any property
expressed in those terms. Unlike heat, which
reduces to molecular kinetic energy, being a
reason does not reduce to anything else.
As you might guess, the details of this argu-
ment need careful scrutiny. This is difficult ter-
rain, even for experts. The force of Parfit’s
reasoning turns on whether his principle about
information, identity and meaning is true. But
the truth of this principle is far from obvious
and Parfit does not argue for it. It is hard not to
be dismayed by this omission. One of the
defining achievements of so-called “analytic
philosophy” was a great advance in clarity
about the dimensions of meaning, through the
work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell,
followed by, among others, Saul Kripke and
Gareth Evans. None of this work is cited by
Parfit. His approach to the philosophy of lan-
guage has an autodidactic quality, as he rein-
vents its basic tools from scratch. It is difficult
to make progress without standing on the
shoulders of giants, and it is inefficient, too.
A consequence of Parfit’s homemade appa-
ratus is that an awful lot of space in these vol-
umes is devoted to misunderstandings
between Parfit and his critics. Numerous chap-
ters attempt to translate from one proprietary
idiom of meanings, concepts and properties
into another. This is especially true in Parfit’s
exchanges with Peter Railton, who is more
sympathetic than Parfit is to reductionism in
ethics, and with Allan Gibbard, who is more
puzzled by the idea of ethical truth. Parfit is
encouraged by the fact that, after meticulous
retranslation, there is less disagreement than
he feared between his own position and those
of his interlocutors.
Anxiety about disagreement is a central
theme of On What Matters. Parfit is disturbed
by the idea that his view conflicts with those of
other philosophers, since they are no less likely
to get things right. He concentrates on disa-
greements with contemporaries like Gibbard,
Railton and Bernard Williams. With the partial
exceptions of Hume, Kant and Nietzsche, Par-
fit does not address his relationship with
earlier philosophers. Most of these philoso-
phers reject his non-reductive cognitivism.
There are different reasons for this, but one
common puzzlement is expressed in the rhe-
torical question: “If facts about reasons are
utterly irreducible and independent of us, why
should we care about what they are?” Parfit is
puzzled by this puzzlement, hearing in it only
the asinine query: “Why should I care about
the things I have reason to care about?” But the
question is more plausibly understood as a
demand that reasons bear some intelligible
relation to our nature as agents or as human
beings. On Parfit’s approach, there is no such
relation.
Despite beginning as a historian, Parfit does
not engage in any serious way with the history
of ethics. At the end of Reasons and Persons,
he writes about the future of moral philosophy:
“Disbelief in God, openly admitted by a major-
ity, is a recent event, not yet completed.
Because this event is so recent, Non-Religious
Ethics is at a very early stage. We cannot yet
predict whether, as in Mathematics, we will all
reach agreement. Since we cannot know how
Ethics will develop, it is not irrational to have
high hopes”. But non-religious ethics is not
especially young. It is about as old as Western
philosophy. What is relatively young is the
attempt to make sense of ethics in the after-
math of the Enlightenment. For some philoso-
phers, this means going back to Aristotle; for
others, it means turning to Hume or Kant. Per-
haps these are all wrong turns, as Parfit must
believe. But their proponents are neglected,
not refuted, by his work.
In principle, Parfit’s disengagement from
the history of analytic and earlier philosophy
could be generative. It could make room for
bold new ideas. But it is also a liability. While
there are moments of genius in On What Mat-
ters, there are moments that frustrate as well.
Professional philosophers will make time to
read it; they will study it and learn from it.
Those less patient and more cynical may turn
instead to Reasons and Persons, to the passa-
ges chanted by Tibetan monks, and to a picture
of themselves at once perplexing and persua-
sive, beautiful and bizarre.
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A questionable perk of life as a professional
philosopher is being the occasional recipient
of unsolicited monographs by self-published
amateurs. Affectionately known as “crazy
books”, these volumes crash the mailroom of
a Philosophy Department, bearing titles like
Ethics of the Astral Plane or The Key To All
Ontologies. They promise answers to the
deepest, oldest questions: the meaning of life,
the universe and everything, unearthed with-
out the help of experts or academic training.
Once, when I made light of a recent arrival, a
colleague stopped me short. He always felt
bad, he said, that we did not have time to read
these books. What if somewhere within them
were the insights of an untutored genius, lost
forever through the impatient cynicism of
people like us?
I hope Derek Parfit’s friends will not be
offended when I say that my colleague’s
admonition made me think of him. The author
of two wildly ambitious books in moral philos-
ophy, Reasons and Persons (1984) and On
What Matters (2011), Parfit had no formal
education in the subject. He read history at
Oxford, then switched to philosophy while
visiting Columbia and Harvard, before return-
ing to Oxford as a Prize Fellow at All Souls
College, where he read, thought, and wrote
about philosophy – amid numerous visiting
appointments in the US – until his unexpected
death in January 2017.
The announcement of Parfit’s death
inspired deep and widespread grief among
philosophers. In part, this is because so many
owe personal debts to his extraordinary intel-
lectual generosity. Parfit was legendary for the
speed, acuity and sheer volume of his com-
mentary on others’ work. But the grief reflects,
too, Parfit’s stature as perhaps the pre-eminent
moral philosopher of the past fifty years. Par-
fit’s work has had a profound impact on anglo-
phone philosophy and it is safe to predict that
its influence will persist.
Parfit was prodigiously inventive, over-
flowing with ideas. But some are especially
central. The first, and still the most significant,
is that our identity over time and distinctness
from one another are less substantial, both
metaphysically and ethically, than many of us
suppose. This idea is what lies behind a pas-
sage from Parfit’s first book, Reasons and Per-
sons, quoted in almost every obituary: “When
I believed [in a deep fact of personal identity],
I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life
seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I
was moving faster every year, and at the end of
which there was darkness. When I changed my
view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared.
I now live in the open air”. 
Parfit’s view about the unimportance of per-
sonal identity is hard to formulate briefly and
the arguments in support of it are intricate,
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